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INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in
1
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. It reversed the
decisions of four lower courts, all of which had concluded that an
2
Indian tribal court had jurisdiction over a non-member defendant.
In doing so, the Supreme Court further modified the federal
common law of tribal court jurisdiction and provided further
clarification regarding the general tribal jurisdiction rule and its two
3
exceptions first established in Montana v. United States.
The legal evolution of Indian tribal sovereignty has moved in
contradictory directions at different points in U.S. history. The result
is that predicting whether, and when, tribal courts have authority can
be difficult, particularly when it comes to people or entities that are
not tribal members. This can be particularly problematic when nonmembers and members do business together. The lack of certainty
regarding the applicable law or applicable forum can add transaction
costs to already expensive economic disputes.
This article will discuss the facts that gave rise to the Plains Commerce Bank case, the development of the Montana rule and its exceptions, and the Supreme Court’s holding in Plains Commerce Bank as
well as its implications for tribal jurisdiction.
II. FACTS
Plains Commerce Bank essentially involved a lending relationship
4
that went awry. While the dispute ended up being litigated in tribal
court, the nagging question throughout the case, which required a
decision from the Supreme Court to resolve, was whether the tribal
5
court had jurisdiction to litigate the dispute. The intricacies of the
facts foreshadow the difficulty in answering this question.
A. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation
At one time, the Sioux Tribes claimed a large part of the Dakotas
6
as their own. But treaties, Congressional divestiture, land allotments,
1. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
2. Id at 2716.
3. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
4. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2714.
5. Id.
6. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 682 (1993); Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1984).
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7

and sales significantly diminished the Sioux Tribe’s land. The Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1868 established the now defunct Great Sioux
Reservation, consisting of more than sixty-million acres, principally in
8
western South Dakota and southwestern North Dakota. The Indian
General Allotment Act of 1887, however, provided for diminishment
of this reservation by enabling non-Indians to acquire fee title to
9
“surplus” land on the reservation. In 1889, Congress replaced the
Great Sioux Reservation with a number of smaller reservations, which
10
included the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation (the Reservation).
The boundaries of the Reservation encompass large areas of De11
wey and Ziebach counties in north-central South Dakota. Further
sales and transfers of individually- and tribally-owned lands within the
Reservation occurred when Congress later opened up 1.6 million
acres of land within Reservation boundaries for homesteading by non12
Indians. Today, non-Indians own substantial land within Reservation
boundaries, including the land at issue in this case.
B. The Parties
Plains Commerce Bank (the Bank) is a South Dakota banking
13
corporation. It has a branch in Hoven, South Dakota, which is
14
located near but not on the Reservation. The Long Family Land and
Cattle Company (the Long Company), on the other hand, is a South
Dakota ranching and farming corporation located on the Reserva15
16
tion. The Long Company was incorporated on March 24, 1987.
Shortly thereafter, the Indian-owned Long Company, which was
eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) guaranteed loans pursuant
17
to 25 C.F.R. § 103.25, began lending relations with the Bank.
Cheyenne River Sioux tribal members Ronnie Long and his wife, Lila
7. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 682; Solem, 465 U.S. at 468–69.
8. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 art. 2, 15 Stat. 635.
9. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
10. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 682.
11. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709,
2715 (2008).
12. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908).
13. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2714.
16. South Dakota Secretary of State, Business Services, http://apps.sd.gov/
applications/st32cprs/AllDocuments.aspx? &BID=DF026227 (last visited Nov. 2,
2009).
17. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2728 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 103.25)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Long, (the Longs) have a majority shareholder interest in the Long
Company.
C. The Land
The primary collateral underlying the loan arrangements between the Bank and the Long Company consisted of approximately
2230 acres of pasture and farm land on the Reservation in Dewey
18
County, South Dakota, and a home in Timber Lake, South Dakota.
Kenneth Long, Ronnie Long’s father, and a non-tribal member,
19
owned this property in fee status before his death. In 1992, Kenneth
Long mortgaged this property to the Bank as security for the Long
20
Company’s debt.
21
Kenneth Long died on July 17, 1995. On September 26, 1995,
the Bank filed a creditor’s claim against the estate for the Long
22
Company’s debts; demanding $750,000. In lieu of foreclosure,
Kenneth Long’s second wife, Paulette Long, provided a personal
representative’s deed for the real estate and home in Timber Lake to
23
the Bank.
D.

The Contracts

The Bank and the Long Company then entered into two con24
tracts: a loan agreement and a lease with option to purchase. The
25
parties entered into the loan agreement on December 5, 1996.
Under the terms of the loan agreement, the Bank credited the Long
Company debt for the farm real estate, and the home in Timber Lake
26
deeded to the Bank. The loan agreement required the Bank to
request that the BIA increase the guarantee on one outstanding Long
Company loan from 84% to 90%, and to reschedule payment of the
27
delinquent note over twenty years. The Bank also was to request that
28
the BIA provide a 90% guarantee for a new operating loan. If the
18. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1073 (D.S.D. 2006).
19. Id.
20. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715.
21. Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1073–74.
25. Id. at 1074.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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BIA guarantee requests were approved, the Bank was to make an
29
additional loan of $53,500 to the Long Company. The parties also
entered into a two-year lease with the option to purchase the pasture
farm real estate o5n December 5, 1996. The option price was
30
$468,000.
E. The Relationship
By letter dated December 12, 1996, the Bank claimed that it ful31
filled its obligation to request the agreed BIA guarantees. During
the winter, while the BIA request was pending, the Bank issued loans
32
to the Long Company totaling approximately $24,000. The BIA
provided no response until February 14, 1997, when it rejected the
33
Bank’s application as incomplete. By that time, most of the cattle
the Long Company had proposed to use as collateral for the loans
34
had perished in harsh winter conditions. Because the BIA rejected
the application, and the contemplated loan could no longer be
sufficiently collateralized, the Bank did not make the loan. It did,
35
however, provide subsequent additional financing.
The Long Company failed to exercise its option to purchase the
36
farm real estate in December 1998. On March 17, 1999, with the
Long Company still in possession of approximately 960 acres, the
Bank sold 320 acres of pasture land to Ralph and Norma Pesicka, who
37
are not members of the tribe. The Pesickas paid $49,600 in cash for
38
the land, or $155 per acre. Edward and Mary Maciejewski, who are
not members of the tribe, purchased the remaining 1905 acres from
39
the Bank for $401,100 under a contract for deed on June 29, 1999.
The Maciejewskis paid approximately $210 per acre for the remaining
pasture and farm land. The Long Company remained in possession
40
of 960 acres.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1073–74.
31. Id. at 1074.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Joint App. at 141–43, Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 07411), 2008 WL 467351.
39. Id. at 148–57.
40. Aff. of Charles Simon, Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d (D.S.D. 2006)
(No. CIV 05-3002) (on file with District of South Dakota)

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
6. Banker.docx

570

1/18/2010 9:25 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

Together, the Maciejewskis and the Pesickas paid approximately
$450,700 for the part of the property they acquired. According to the
terms of the option to purchase, if the Long Company had exercised
the option for $468,000, it would have been reduced to a net cost of
41
$443,600.
F.

The Tribal Courts

The Long Company continued in possession of 960 acres of the
property following the expiration of the lease. Therefore, the Bank
sought to serve a Notice to Quit on the Long Company as a prerequisite to the action for forcible entry and detainer it filed in South
42
Dakota state court. Because off-reservation process servers cannot
effectuate valid service on the Reservation, the Bank sent the notice to
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court (Tribal Court) on June 15,
43
1999, asking that the Tribal Court authorize service. The notice was
44
then served by a tribal process server.
In response to the Bank’s Notice to Quit, Ronnie and Lila Long
commenced the underlying Tribal Court action, seeking a temporary
45
restraining order against the Bank. The Bank responded, denying
46
Tribal Court jurisdiction and opposing entry of injunctive relief.
The Tribal Court upheld jurisdiction and issued a preliminary
47
injunction.
Ronnie and Lila Long then amended their complaint, adding the
Long Company as a plaintiff. They asserted several causes of action,
including breach of contract and discrimination. The Bank answered,
48
again denying Tribal Court jurisdiction. The Bank also filed a
counterclaim seeking eviction of the Long Company from the 960
acres of the farm real estate it continued to hold and damages for
49
holding over under the lease.
A trial was held before a Tribal Court jury in Eagle Butte, South
50
Dakota, on December 6 and December 11, 2002. In addition to the
41. Joint App., supra note 38, at 98.
42. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1074 (D.S.D. 2006).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1075.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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contract claim, the Longs asserted that the Bank discriminated against
them by preventing the Long Company from exercising the option to
purchase the leased property and for charging a higher per-acre value
51
than the subsequent non-member purchasers. The discrimination
claim was submitted to the jury as a claim by Ronnie and Lila Long,
52
The jury returned a general verdict
not the Long Company.
encompassing all claims of the Longs and the Long Company against
the Bank for $750,000 and indicated that interest should also be
awarded. The jury found that the Bank had discriminated against
53
Ronnie Long and Lila Long.
On post-trial motions, the Tribal Court upheld jurisdiction over
the Bank; ruled that federal law supported the discrimination claim;
added pre-judgment interest to the judgment; and gave the Long
Company an option to purchase the 960 acres it possessed by offset
54
against the judgment.
The Bank appealed the judgment to the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Court of Appeals (“Tribal Court of Appeals”). In an opinion
dated November 22, 2004, the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed the
Tribal Court ruling, agreeing with the Tribe that the discrimination
claim was based on tribal common law arising out of tribal tradition
55
and custom. Neither party had previously argued that the discrimination claim was based upon tribal tort law. The Tribe does not have
56
a codified discrimination statute.
G. The Federal Courts
The Bank then commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the
57
U.S. District Court, District of South Dakota, Central Division. The
Bank moved for judgment based upon the Tribal Court’s lack of
jurisdiction, as well as the violation of its due-process rights. The
58
Longs made a cross-motion for declaratory judgment. The District
Court ruled in favor of the Longs, finding that the Tribal Court had
jurisdiction over the discrimination claim pursuant to the “consensual
relationship” element of the first exception articulated in Montana v.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
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United States, and ruled that due process was not violated.
The Bank appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, arguing that the District Court erred in ruling that the
Tribal Court had jurisdiction and that the Bank was afforded due
61
process.
Specifically, the Bank challenged the District Court’s
determination of jurisdiction based on consent and a voluntary
62
consensual relationship with tribal members. It argued that the
Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over the federal claim, and that
the after-the-fact assertion of tribal discrimination law resulted in a
63
violation of the Bank’s due-process rights.
64
The Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the District Court. It
found that the Bank’s due-process rights had not been violated, and
that the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Bank fell
within the inherent authority of the Tribe under the first Montana
65
exception. According to the Circuit Court, the Bank formed a
consensual relationship with tribal members. Thus, the tribal tort law
the Longs invoked was an “other means” by which a tribe may
66
regulate non-member conduct.
The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
67
which it granted on January 4, 2008. In its petition, the Bank
explicitly declined to seek review of two arguments made below: 1)
whether tribal courts generally lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
based on federal law; and 2) whether the Tribal Court’s judgment
below should be denied comity because the Bank was denied due
68
process.

59. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (“A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”).
60. Plains Commerce Bank, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
61. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 881
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the claim arose under tribal authority to regulate, and
the Bank was not denied due process).
62. Id. at 884.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 892.
65. Id. at 888.
66. Id.
67. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. 128 S. Ct. 2709
(2008).
68. Id. at 2712.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONTANA RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Considerable legal debate has been devoted to resolving federal
and state sovereignty issues arising out of the U.S. Constitution. But
on the matter of tribal sovereignty in the federal system, the Constitution does not provide much guidance. It merely establishes that
Congress has the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
69
Tribes.”
It therefore fell to the courts to define the status of Indian tribes
with respect to state and federal authority. Three cases decided
between 1810 and 1832, known as the Marshall trilogy, established a
number of guiding principles that have influenced the resolution of
70
tribal sovereignty questions ever since.
A. Pre-Montana
In Fletcher v. Peck, the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson dis71
cussed how tribal sovereignty had been diminished by treaties.
Justice Johnson observed that some tribes’ sovereignty had been
limited so that all that remained was the authority to govern people
within the limits of their territory: “All the restrictions upon the right
of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors
from their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty
amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits
72
except themselves.” This foreshadowed the idea that tribes inherently lacked authority over non-members.
The development of federal common law regarding tribal sove73
reignty continued in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Cherokee involved a
74
challenge by the Cherokee Tribe against the State of Georgia. The
tribe challenged the state’s right to pass legislation affecting the
75
existence of the tribe within the state. Although the Court did not
ultimately decide that issue, the opinion noted that a tribe’s relationship with the United States is “marked by peculiar and cardinal
76
distinctions which exist no where else.” The opinion coined the
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
71. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 147.
73. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 16.
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phrasing that tribes were perhaps more properly thought of as
77
“domestic dependent nations.” This idea was developed further by
78
the Court in Worcester v. Georgia. Worcester involved another dispute
79
between the Cherokee Tribe and the State of Georgia. The question
presented in the case involved whether states had jurisdiction to pass
80
laws that would infringe on tribal sovereignty.
Worcester noted that by virtue of aboriginal political and territorial
81
status, tribes possessed certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty.
These vestiges of sovereignty were subject to diminution or elimina82
tion by the United States, but not by the states. It is this limited
inherent sovereignty and corresponding dependency upon United
States for protection that imposed a trust relationship between the
tribes and the United States that has been a fundamental part of their
relationship ever since.
As time went by, these federal common law concepts were shaped
by subsequent treaty developments in the nineteenth-century wars
between the United States and Indian tribes. In particular, with
83
respect to the Sioux Tribe, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 is an
important starting point. The treaty sought to end hostilities between
84
various tribes and the United States.
But following additional
hostilities, the United States entered into the Fort Laramie Treaty of
85
86
1868. The treaty established The Great Sioux Reservation. The
reservation comprised virtually all of what is now South Dakota west of
87
the Missouri River, as well as part of what is now North Dakota. The
Treaty explicitly recognized a number of tribal powers, including the
88
exclusive right to use reservation lands.
The rights under this treaty were later further modified by Congress. In the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, Congress

77. Id. at 17.
78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
79. Id. at 537–40.
80. See id. at 521.
81. Id. at 557
82. See id.
83. Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749
[hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie].
84. Id. art. 1.
85. Treaty with the Sioux—Brule, Oglala, Minicinjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa,
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee—and Arapaho, Apr. 29, 1869,
15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty with the Sioux].
86. Id. art. 2.
87. See id. (setting out the boundaries of the reservation).
88. Id.
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provided non-Indians with fee title to some of the unallotted and
89
surplus lands on the reservation. Then in the Act of March 2, 1889,
Congress greatly reduced the Great Sioux Reservation, replacing it
90
with smaller reservations. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
located in north-central South Dakota, was the largest of these smaller
reservations with boundaries established by the Act that encompassed
91
2.9 million acres. With the Act of May 29, 1908, Congress further
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to open 1.6 million acres of
92
the reservation to homesteading and settlement by non-Indians. As
a result of these (and subsequent) actions by Congress, some of the
land within the Reservation boundaries is owned by the Tribe and its
members; some is owned by non-members.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 allowed officially recog93
nized tribes to form their own constitutions and governments. The
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, in turn, established tribal bylaws that
provided for a tribal court with the power to preside over civil and
94
petty offenses pertaining to all tribal members.
Similarly, the
Constitution of the Cheyenne River Sioux provides tribal courts the
authority to adjudicate claims or disputes arising among or affecting
95
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The Tribe’s provisions for its
courts, nevertheless, do not answer the question of whether those
courts have any authority over non-members.
96
Two cases, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and United States v.
97
Wheeler, foreshadowed the eventual development of the Montana
rule in 1981. Oliphant involved a challenge by a non-Indian against a
98
tribe attempting to subject him to criminal liability in tribal court.
The Court ultimately concluded in Oliphant that tribes lack the power
99
to try non-Indians for crimes. Wheeler held that tribes retain that

89. See Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389–90 (1887).
90. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888, 888–89 (1889).
91. Dan Barry, A Rising but Doubted Dream on a Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2009, at A10 (stating that reservation consists of 2.9 million acres).
92. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460, 460–462 (1908).
93. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 38 Stat. 984, 984 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1988)).
94. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE, art. IV, § 1,
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/cheyennesioux_const.htm.
95. Id.
96. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
97. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
98. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194–95.
99. Id. at 211.
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100

power to punish member offenders.
Wheeler states that tribal
members are subject to “inherent powers of limited sovereignty that
101
have never been extinguished.” Where not withdrawn by treaty or
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
102
status, tribes retain certain sovereign powers. The precise scope of
those retained powers, though, remained undefined.
B. Montana
When discussion turns to the reach and confines of tribal jurisdiction over non-members, arguably, no single case has had more
103
impact on this area of the law than Montana v. United States, and for
good reason. Montana was and remains the first and perhaps most
general expression by the Supreme Court of the bounds of tribal
104
jurisdiction over non-members. Building upon Oliphant, a decision
which foreclosed the possibility of tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians in criminal cases, the Montana court articulated the now oftquoted general rule that the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe”
105
except under the circumstances of two very narrow exceptions.
In Montana, the Court was called upon to decide whether the
Crow Tribe and the United States as Trustee for the Tribe had sole
authority to regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation,
particularly within the Big Horn River, or whether the State of
106
Montana had the authority to do so. By tribal regulation, the Crow
Tribe of Montana had sought to prohibit hunting and fishing within
107
its reservation by anyone who was not a member of the tribe. After
examining various treaties between the United States and the Tribe
and other materials, the Court determined that title to the riverbed
and corresponding banks passed to the State of Montana upon its
108
admission into the Union. Although the Tribe could prohibit or
regulate hunting or fishing by non-members on land belonging to the
100. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 (“It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to
enforce their criminal laws against tribe members.”).
101. Id. (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)
(emphasis in original)).
102. Id. at 323.
103. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
104. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
105. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
106. Id. at 547.
107. Id. at 549.
108. Id. at 551–57.
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Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, it had no
power to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land
109
owned in fee by non-members of the Tribe.
Importantly, in reaching this decision, the Court focused on the
concept of “inherent sovereignty,” explaining that through their
original incorporation into the United States as well as specific treaties
and statutes, the Indian tribes had lost many of the attributes of
sovereignty, particularly as to the relations between a tribe and non110
members.
The Court reasoned that exercise of tribal authority
“beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
111
delegation.” Indeed, as the Court of Appeals had previously noted,
it would defy common sense to suppose Congress would intend that
non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal
jurisdiction when the very purpose of allotment was elimination of
112
tribal government.
Through this contextual lens then, it is clear that the rule set
forth in Montana (that tribes generally lack jurisdiction over nonmembers) is inextricably intertwined with the effect of the allotment
policies, land alienation, and treaty rights tied to the use and occupa113
tion of lands inside a reservation.
Taken to its logical end, the
theory of inherent sovereignty (or its corollary principle, implied
divestiture) necessarily means that once a tribe divests ownership of a
piece of land (either through allotment or otherwise), it no longer
retains the power to regulate non-member conduct on the land.
Accordingly, to determine tribal jurisdiction over a non-member, the
analysis must first begin with a determination of land ownership.
Thus, assuming the land at issue is owned by a non-member nonIndian, the general Montana rule would apply, and the non-member
would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction except under two circumstances.
The first exception, commonly referred to as the “consensual
relationship” exception, provides that “[a] tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 557–67.
Id. at 564.
Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
Id. at 559 n.9.
Id. at 559–65.
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members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
114
arrangements.” In creating this exception, the Court reasoned that
tribes still retained some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-members,
115
even on non-Indian land.
Similarly, for the second exception, the Court concluded that
tribes necessarily retained inherent powers to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians “when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
116
the health or welfare of the tribe.”
Viewed from any angle, the “general rule” precluding tribal jurisdiction over non-members is broad and the land ownership component is critical. Since deciding Montana, the absence of tribal
ownership over non-member lands inside a reservation “has been
virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction” over a
117
118
non-member.
With one minor exception (a zoning case), the
Supreme Court has never upheld, under Montana, the extension of
tribal civil authority over non-members on non-Indian fee land inside
119
a reservation. Through examination of the principles outlined by
the Supreme Court in Montana, it becomes readily apparent that the
exceptions for cases involving non-member conduct on non-Indianowned land inside a reservation are rather limited.
C. Post-Montana
Since deciding Montana, the Supreme Court has, from time to
time, been called upon to analyze the scope of tribal jurisdiction over
non-members. While some commentators believe the Court has
continued to refine the Montana analysis since deciding the case
nearly thirty years ago, others believe that subsequent decisions have
led to further erosion of tribal autonomy which began over twohundred years ago. We will not debate these principles here, but
rather recognize that a dichotomy of opinions on the topic exists. A
fair and perhaps neutral observation of this evolving area of the law
would be that, at the very least, in decisions following Montana, the
Supreme Court has put a finer point on the confines of tribal
114. Id. at 565 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 566.
117. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001).
118. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
119. Id.
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jurisdiction over non-member activities on non-Indian land inside a
reservation than first announced in Montana.
120
In National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians, a
case involving a school district and its insurer seeking to prevent an
injured schoolboy from executing a default judgment against the
school district, the Court considered the potential for tribal civil
adjudicatory authority over a non-consenting non-member. Ultimately, the case was resolved through application of the exhaustion-oftribal-remedies doctrine. The Court characterized the civil adjudicatory question as supporting Congress’s commitment to a policy of
121
tribal self-government and self-determination. The Court held that,
in order to determine a tribal court’s jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty
must be examined, including “the extent to which that sovereignty
has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and
122
elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”
123
Later, in South Dakota v. Bourland, the Court defined the scope
of rights enjoyed by Indian tribes, which it first alluded to in Montana.
Specifically, the Court determined that the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe had given up, by operation of the General Allotment Act of
1887, the Act of 1889, and the Act of 1908, its right to regulate non124
members on non-Indian-owned land inside the reservation.
The
Court reasoned that when a tribe or Congress conveys ownership of
tribal lands to non-Indians, the tribe loses the right of absolute and
125
exclusive use and occupation of these lands.
According to the
Court, “[t]he abrogation of this greater right . . . implies the loss of
126
regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others.” In other
words, “the power to regulate is of diminished practical use if it does
not include the power to exclude: Regulatory authority goes hand in
127
hand with the power to exclude.”
Following Montana and Bourland, the Court seemingly clarified
the intended narrowness of both exceptions in Strate v. A-1 Contrac128
tors. In Strate, a highway traffic accident occurred on the right-of-way
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

471 U.S. 845 (1985).
Id. at 856.
Id. at 855–56.
508 U.S. 679 (1993).
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 691 n.11.
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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129

owned by North Dakota, but inside the reservation. A driver, his
employer, the employer’s insurer, and the tribal court sought a
declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims of a non-Indian driver (the widow of a tribal
member and mother of tribal members) for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident on a state highway that ran through reservation
130
land. The Court held that when the accident occurred on a portion
of a public highway maintained by the state under a federally granted
right-of-way over Indian reservation land, tribal courts could not
entertain a civil action against the allegedly negligent driver or the
131
driver’s employer, neither of whom was a member of the tribe. It
was held that absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern
the conduct of non-members on the highway in question, the court
132
would not have jurisdiction. The Court determined this piece of
land to be the equivalent of the alienated, non-Indian lands at issue in
133
Montana, Brendale, and Bourland. For that reason, the Court found
that the case fit within the general rule announced in Montana,
declaring that tribes lack authority to regulate or adjudicate the
conduct of non-members on non-Indian land inside a reservation
134
absent one of two exceptions.
The Strate decision is important for two reasons. First, with regard to the “consensual relationship” exception, the Court provided
litigants with an outer boundary for determining whether a preexisting relationship between a non-member and member falls within
135
the “consensual relationship” exception.
Strate involved an
automobile accident where the driver was on alienated land inside a
reservation as a result of his company contracting with the tribe to
136
perform various work inside the reservation. The Court concluded
this was not enough to satisfy the consensual relationship exception
because the automobile accident was itself too attenuated from or
beyond the scope of whatever consensual relationship existed
137
between the driver, his employer, and the tribe.
Similarly, with respect to the second Montana exception concern129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 454–55.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1980).
Strate, 520 U.S. at 440.
Id.
Id.
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ing conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,
the Court concluded that the seminal question is whether a State’s or
Territory’s exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal self138
government. The Court quickly concluded that this exception was
139
not invoked in a pedestrian automobile accident. Furthermore, the
Court rejected the argument that Montana’s general rule against tribal
authority over non-members applied only to regulatory (as opposed to
adjudicatory) authority, holding that a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction
140
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.
Following Strate, the Court elaborated upon the “consensual rela141
tionship” exception in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley. In Atkinson,
the Court concluded that the Navajo Nation could not tax non-tribal
member guests of a hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the
142
reservation.
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the principles
underlying the general rule precluding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, that “Indian tribes are ‘unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’
but their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal
143
civil-authority beyond these limits.” The Court rejected the Navajo
Nation’s contention that a consensual relationship existed between
the guest and the Tribe based on the guest’s acceptance of benefits
144
from services potentially rendered by the Tribe. Rather, the Court
found that receipt of such services did not satisfy the requisite
145
relationship prong of the first exception. According to the Court, if
that were the case, the exception would swallow the rule as all nonIndian fee lands within a reservation benefit, to some extent, from the
146
advantages of a civilized society offered by the Indian tribe.
In contrast to the developed body of case law regarding the first
Montana exception, there is no comparable line of cases for the
second Montana or “adjudicatory” exception. Since articulating the
second exception in 1981, the Court has never applied it to find that a
tribe had civil adjudicatory authority jurisdiction over a non-member
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
532 U.S. 645, 656–57 (2001).
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id.
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defendant. At present, it merely remains an unrealized possibility.
IV. THE PLAINS COMMERCE BANK OPINION
For nearly eight years after deciding Hicks and Atkinson, the Supreme Court left open the question whether a commercial business
relationship between a non-Indian owning fee land and a tribal
member would allow the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over the
non-member as an “other means” of regulating its conduct under the
Montana “consensual relationship” exception. In a 5–4 majority
decision in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., the
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, upholding
147
thirty years of precedent.
To say the facts of Plains Commerce Bank presented the Court with
a clear-cut answer under Montana and its progeny would be a gross
overstatement. The lending relationship between the parties had
become convoluted over time and the trial and appellate records
148
facing the Court were anything but clear. Moreover, from a policy
perspective, implications of the Court’s decision would be far
reaching regardless of the outcome.
The Court quickly disposed of arguments that the Bank lacked
149
standing to bring the appeal, or that a relatively pedestrian commercial lending relationship between the Bank and a South Dakota
corporation somehow invoked tribal welfare or political and economic interests of the “catastrophic” magnitude sufficient to invoke the
150
second Montana “civil adjudication” exception. The Court focused
its analysis on the Montana general rule and the first or “consensual
151
relationship” exception, and this is where we will focus our analysis.
The linchpin of the Court’s decision is remarkably simple: the
first Montana exception contemplates regulation of conduct of a nonmember, but said conduct does not include the non-Indian to non152
Indian sale of already non-Indian-owned fee land. This distinction
can only fully be understood by going back to the very roots of over
two hundred years of American jurisprudence concerning relations
between the United States and the Indian tribes.
In deciding Montana and subsequent “first exception cases,” the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723–26 (2008).
Id. at 2715–16.
Id. at 2716–18.
Id. at 2726–27.
Id. at 2721–26.
Id. at 2723.
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Court has adhered unwaveringly to the concept of implied divestiture,
a concept grounded in the allotment acts enacted by Congress during
153
the formative years of this country, as discussed above. Tribes are,
in essence, nations within a nation, a relationship unlike that of any
154
other. By virtue of this “reduced” status, they possess sovereignty
only to the extent necessary to protect the political integrity, health,
155
and welfare of their members.
This is where their sovereignty
156
ends. As a result, courts have allowed regulation of non-member
conduct on fee land only in cases that “flow directly from these
157
158
limited sovereign interests.”
In Duro v. Reina, for example, the
Court found that the tribes retained power to exclude persons from
tribal land, and gave tribes the power to set conditions on entry to
159
that land via licensing requirements and hunting regulation.
Similarly, the tribe’s power to tax certain items is retained “insofar as
taxation enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential
160
services.”
Regulation of the sale of non-Indian fee land is nothing of the
kind. Unlike the aforementioned types of regulation, it cannot be
justified by mere reference to the tribe’s remaining sovereign
interests. As articulated by the Court, “[b]y definition, fee land
owned by non-members has already been removed from the tribe’s
161
immediate control.” Thus, tribes “cannot justify regulation of such
land’s sale by reference to its power to superintend tribal land, then,
162
because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land.” Tribal
retained interests in protecting internal relations and self-government
with respect to regulation of non-member owned fee land is necessarily unavailing for the same reason.
In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court put a fine point on what it
considered to be regulation beyond the inherent retained powers of
163
tribes. However, it left open the possibility that certain uses by nonmembers of non-Indian-owned fee land may be regulated by the Tribe
if said uses were noxious or otherwise threatened tribal welfare or
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 2718.
Id.
Id. at 2718–19.
Id. at 2723.
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
Id. at 687.
Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2723.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2724, 2728.
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164

security. Such regulation, though, was only allowed to the extent
necessary to curb non-member activities relating to use of the land,
not the mere act of its resale, which, in this case, respondents alleged
165
gave rise to the tribal discrimination claim at issue.
Needless to say, the dissenting Justices saw things differently.
Justice Ginsberg filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Stevens,
166
Souter, and Breyer. In its scintillating opinion, the dissent charged
the majority with having failed to follow the principles espoused in
Montana and subsequent decisions by creating an artificial distinction
between the sale of non-Indian fee land and other types of regulation
presumably allowed under the plain language of the first Montana
exception—for example, regulation of “commercial dealing, con167
tracts, [and] leases,” a result the dissent found “perplexing.” Given
inclusion of the word “lease” within the language of the first Montana
exception, the dissent posed the question “why should a nonmember’s lease of fee land to a member be differentiated, for
168
Montana exception purposes, from a sale of the same land?” The
answer is “implied divestiture,” and the analysis, going back to
Montana, begins with the ownership of the land.
To begin with, reservation land leased by a tribal member to a
non-member is of a different character than that of non-Indian fee
land, the latter type having already been alienated by the tribe.
Bourland and Strate teach that under the notion of implied divestiture,
the tribe no longer possesses (or possesses to a much lesser extent)
169
the ability to regulate the non-Indian fee land.
Thus, as the
argument goes, once the tribe (or Congress) permits the sale of the
land to a non-Indian, the tribe necessarily divests itself of its inherent
sovereign power to regulate the non-member’s sale of the land.
Regulation of a non-Indian land sale is beyond the inherent powers
retained by the tribe to provide for the political integrity, welfare,
170
health, or governance of the internal relations of its members.
The analysis then proceeds to look at the “consensual relationship” at issue, which Strate and Atkinson have taught is not all encom-

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2724.
Id. at 2725.
Id. at 2727.
Id. at 2730 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2719–20 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2723–24.
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171

passing.
Stated succinctly, a relationship between a tribe and
member giving rise to tribal regulation over the non-member’s
conduct in one area does not necessarily mean that the tribe can
regulate all other areas of conduct. It is not “in for a penny, in for a
172
pound.”
In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court noted that the commercial lending relationship and contractual claims between the Bank
173
and petitioners were not at issue.
The key to the Court’s analysis was recognizing that that Longs
were attempting to “re-characterize their claim as turning on the
bank’s alleged failure to pay to respondents loans promised for cattleraising on tribal trust land” when, in fact, “the Longs brought their
discrimination claim seeking to have the land sales set aside on the
ground that the sale to non-members ‘on terms more favorable’ than
174
the bank had extended to the Longs” violated tribal tort law.
In
essence, the Longs’ discrimination claim “challenge[d] a non-Indian’s
sale of non-Indian fee land” and the tribal tort law the Longs attempted to enforce, according to the Court, “acted as a restraint on
175
alienation.”
This distinction is important, because, as the Court
noted, “Montana does not permit Indian tribes to regulate the sale of
non-Indian fee land. Montana and its progeny permit tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the
176
tribe’s sovereign interests.”
The reasoning underpinning this fine distinction can perhaps
best be understood by keeping in mind the limited purpose of the two
Montana exceptions, which is to allow tribes to regulate non-members
only to the extent necessary to “protect tribal self-government [and] to
177
Looking at the case in this way, the
control internal relations.”
Court necessarily concluded that regulation by the tribe of a nonIndian sale of non-Indian land was beyond the intended purpose of
178
the first Montana exception.
Following this reasoning, the Court
determined that the characteristics of the non-Indian, non-member
owned land precluded its sale from being a non-member activity
179
subject to tribal regulation. Further, the Court’s opinion suggests
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 2725.
Id. at 2724 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2720.
Id.
Id. at 2720–21.
Id. at 2721.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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that the tribal discrimination claim was also too attenuated from even
the commercial lending relationship between the Bank and the Long
Family Land and Cattle Company to have allowed the tribal court to
180
exercise jurisdiction over the Bank.
In the final analysis, there will surely be wildly varying views on
the current state and future direction of tribal jurisdiction. While
some will praise the Court’s decision as keeping in line with Montana
and its progeny, others will surely criticize it. One thing is for certain
though, the Plains Commerce Bank decision provides members with a
brighter line for determining the outer boundaries of tribal regulation over non-members than ever before. In a nutshell, tribes lack
jurisdiction to regulate or adjudicate a non-Indian’s sale of nonIndian fee land inside a reservation because this non-member activity
is beyond the intended purpose and scope of the Montana exceptions,
which only permit tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-members on
non-Indian lands inside a reservation to the extent necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. As
discussed below, this is something from which both tribes and nonmembers may one day benefit.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION
The road to understanding tribal jurisdiction over non-members
arguably became a little smoother in light of the Plains Commerce Bank
decision. Yet, there are still potholes left to be filled. Retired baseball
pitcher Vernon Sanders Law is credited with saying that “experience is
181
a hard teacher because she gives the test first, the lesson afterwards.”
If that is the case, and Plains Commerce Bank was the “test,” what lessons
have we learned?
First and foremost, inclusion of choice of forum and law provisions in the lending agreement between the Bank and the Long
Family Land & Cattle Co. might have negated the entire lawsuit
altogether. Though the contract was not directly at issue in the
appeal, one must wonder what would have happened had the loan
agreement between the parties contained language similar to the
following: “any and all disputes arising from or relating to this
agreement shall be heard in South Dakota Court and be governed by
South Dakota law.” Indeed, the case may very well have never wound
180. Id.
181. JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, UNCOMMON SENSE: THE WORLD’S FULLEST COMPENDIUM OF
WISDOM 118 (1987).
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up before the Supreme Court as the parties’ intent regarding
jurisdiction over claims arising from or relating to the lending
relationship would have been clear from the outset. Of course, there
is no guarantee inclusion of this language would have avoided
litigation altogether, or that it would have precluded the tribal courts
from hearing the case in the first instance.
But supposing the parties’ agreement did contain South Dakota
choice of law and forum selection clauses, would the parties have
needed to litigate the matter to finality in tribal court before the Bank
could seek an injunction in federal court by raising jurisdictional
arguments? The answer is probably “no.” National Farmers Union v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, an exhaustion case, teaches that as a general
proposition, a tribal court should be afforded the opportunity in the
first instance to carefully examine whether it has the power to exercise
182
civil subject matter jurisdiction over non-Indians. The caveat to this
proposition is that exhaustion is not required where assertion of tribal
jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack
183
of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”
An agreement between parties containing forum and choice of
law provisions other than tribal court would seemingly negate the
parties’ need to litigate the matter in tribal court in the first instance.
Under those circumstances, a credible argument could be made that
the party seeking to have the matter heard in tribal court acted in bad
faith by disregarding the plain language of the agreement. Moreover,
it could be argued that the choice of law and forum selection clauses
operate as a “jurisdictional prohibition” under the caveat to the
exhaustion principle set forth in National Farmers Union.
The issue of consent to tribal court jurisdiction is arguably no
clearer following the Plains Commerce Bank decision. The Court’s
analysis suggests that if a non-member were to explicitly consent to
tribal court jurisdiction, as in the case of a contractual choice of
forum clause, then perhaps the tribal court would have jurisdiction.
Much less clear, however, is whether it would be possible for a nonmember to implicitly consent to tribal court jurisdiction.
One potential route for such consent might be through conduct.
There is a suggestion in the Plains Commerce Bank opinion that if

182.
183.

471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
Id. at 857 n.21.
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conduct showing implicit consent to tribal court jurisdiction was
sufficiently connected to the consensual relationship contemplated by
the first Montana exception, then perhaps there would be jurisdiction.
But the Court has never held that. Indeed, the Plains Commerce Bank
opinion addressed the absence of jurisdiction in the reverse situation:
conduct where the tribe sought to attach jurisdiction that was
unrelated to the contract between the parties. Strate and Plains
Commerce Bank could be read together to support the conclusion that
a non-member’s consent to tribal court adjudication of a dispute
should be actual and clear.
Problems remain, however, for a non-member defendant whoa
finds himself defending a lawsuit in tribal court. For example, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to Indian
184
tribes.
And the handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in
185
tribal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are not
186
identical.
The presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction
therefore squares with one of the principal policy considerations
underlying Oliphant: an overriding concern that non-member citizens
be “protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
187
liberty.”
But it must not be forgotten that tribes do not possess sovereignty
comparable to that of a foreign country; they are not an equal partner
in the scheme of federalism. The Supreme Court can review federal
court decisions. Courts in the state system are both potentially subject
to review by the Supreme Court and operate subject to a qualified
right of removal to federal courts. The tribal court system, however, is
separate and unique. It is wholly distinct from traditional courts of
general jurisdiction. Other than jurisdictional questions, federal
courts provide no substantive review of tribal court proceedings.
Thus, the tribal court system lacks adequate structural protections
against abridging non-member defendants’ constitutional rights. For
this reason, tribal courts’ power to adjudicate members’ claims against
non-members should be constrained. To this point, the Supreme
Court has denied tribal courts broad jurisdiction over non-member
defendants who stand outside members’ political relationships to
their tribes.
184. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
186. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978)).
187. Id. (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210).
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At present, tribal courts still lack an important safeguard that
exists in the federal system with respect to state court jurisdiction.
Congress has explicitly provided for a statutory right of removal from
state court based on either federal-question jurisdiction or diversity of
188
citizenship jurisdiction. To date, Congress has not provided for a
right of removal from tribal court to federal court, though it could
presumably do so. If a right to removal existed that allowed nonmember defendants to remove cases from tribal court to federal
court, there would at least be a procedural safeguard against the
imposition of tribal court jurisdiction over a non-member defendant’s
objection.
As it stands now, however, a non-member defendant in tribal
court who wishes to challenge that jurisdiction must first arguably
exhaust tribal court remedies. Upon then bringing a jurisdictional
challenge in federal court, the non-member defendant may only seek
review of the jurisdictional question, not the underlying merits.
Providing a right of removal or providing a means for review of the
merits on proper appeal from tribal court would represent a step
toward a fairer and more uniform system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Plains Commerce Bank opinion represents the most recent
development in a long line of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
defining the scope of tribal sovereignty. Although it does not
definitively answer the question of whether a tribal court could have
jurisdiction over a non-member defendant, it seemingly makes the
barriers to that more formidable without outright prohibiting the
possibility. The opinion appears to narrow the Montana exceptions by
interpreting them with language that tends toward a more limited
reading of the text of the exceptions. By doing so, the Plains opinion
necessarily strengthens the general rule from Montana that tribes
generally lack authority over non-members.
Though the Supreme Court left open, for now, the ultimate
question as to whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-member
defendants, continued economic interaction between tribes and nonmembers almost assures that the Court will find itself required to
answer this question in the near future.
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2008).
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